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COMMENT
Choice of Law: Defining the Place of Performance for
General Contract Disputes in Oklahoma
I. Introduction
Choice of law is one component of the broader doctrine of conflict of laws1
and provides a framework for determining which jurisdiction’s laws and public
policy should govern a cause of action when the action has “significant
connections” with more than one jurisdiction.2 Dean Prosser likened the topic
of choice of law to a “dismal swamp” because of the complexity of its subject
matter and the “incomprehensible jargon” employed by the scholars who write
on it.3 This comment attempts to wade through the mire and present the
subject of Oklahoma’s contractual choice-of-law rules in a comprehensible
manner. Unfortunately, the topic cannot be discussed without some reference
to the “jargon” that permeates the case law and commentary.
Oklahoma’s choice-of-law jurisprudence is no clearing within the puzzling
jungle that comprises the choice-of-law subject. In Oklahoma, different
choice-of-law theories are applied to tort suits than are applied in contract
actions.4 While the former embraces a more modern interest-analysis
approach, the latter relies on an older, territorial-based standard.5 Oklahoma’s
contractual choice-of-law jurisprudence is grounded on a statutory directive
from title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes which provides: “A
contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where
it is to be performed, or, if it does not indicate a place of performance,
according to the law and usage of the place where it is made.”6
The primary purpose of this comment is to develop a standard for
determining which place of performance should govern a contract when the
parties have not selected their own choice of law and the contract indicates
multiple places of performance. Initially, this question seems as if it should
have been resolved by several different courts many times over; however, such
is not the case. Incidental to this thesis is an examination of Oklahoma’s
1. Russell J. Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 (5th ed. 2006).
The larger doctrine of conflict of laws also examines in which jurisdiction a suit can be brought
and the effect of a foreign judgment. See id.
2. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 1 (1998).
3. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
4. Bernal v. Charter Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 OK 28, ¶ 12, 209 P.3d 309, 315.
5. See Weintraub, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 52.
6. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001).
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choice-of-law rules accompanied by critical commentary that will hopefully
assist both judges and practioners in understanding what the rules are — and
what they are not.
Part II of this comment surveys Oklahoma’s choice-of-law cases in order
to explain the current choice-of-law rules and identify questions left
unanswered by Oklahoma courts. Part III conducts a brief analysis of how
other jurisdictions with statutes identical to section 162 interpret the
provision’s language. Part IV resolves the thesis of this comment and presents
an argument for why section 162 should be understood to contemplate
multiple places of performance. Part IV then formulates this “per-obligation”
approach whereby each obligation in a contract, and the matters relating to it,
are governed by the law of the place where that obligation is to be performed.
This comment concludes in Part V.
II. Oklahoma Case Law
As a general matter, there are two categories of choice-of-law theories. The
first is the old, territorial approach in which the law of the place where some
event occurred or will occur governs the dispute.7 For contract disputes, the
most common application of these theories yields the rule that the nature,
validity and interpretation of a contract are governed by the law of the place
where the contract was made.8 This rule is called “lex loci contractus,” which
means “the place of the contract,” and which can refer to either the place
where the contract is executed or the place where the contract is performed.9
This dual-use of the term has led to some confusion;10 however, the phrase is
easier to understand if it is thought of as the conclusion of an inquiry rather
than as its initiation.
The second category is comprised of various theories that are often referred
to as “issue” or “functional” analysis standards.11 Application of these
standards requires inquiry into the underlying policies of the conflicting laws
to determine which jurisdiction has the greatest interest in its law governing
the dispute at bar.12 The “most significant relationship” test from the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) is a member of this school.

7. See Weintraub, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 52.
8. See Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; see also, e.g.,
C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 195 S.E. 659, 661 (Va. 1938).
9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 995 (9th ed. 2009); see also Kenneth R. Webster, Note,
Contractual Obligations, Conflicts of Law Symposium, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 385, 387 (1965).
10. See Sec. Trust & Savs. Bank v. Gleichmann, 150 P. 908, 911 (Okla. 1915) (per curiam).
11. See Weintraub, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 52.
12. See id.
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Title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes belongs to the territorial
category of choice-of-law theory because the law that governs a dispute is
determined by a geographical location — either the place of performance or
the place of making. However, section 162 does not fit neatly into the lex loci
contractus framework as that rule is commonly understood. The lex loci
contractus rule, stated above, requires the place of making to control all
matters regarding the nature, validity, and interpretation of a contract, while
section 162 emphasizes that the law of the place of performance should
govern. Nevertheless, at least some Oklahoma courts understand section 162
to be a statutory embodiment of the lex loci contractus rule.13 However, this
is not a universally accepted position.14 The discrepancy seems to depend on
whether the term “lex loci contractus” is understood in its dual sense as
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary or as meaning the choice-of-law rule
articulated above.
This comment approaches section 162 without any opinion on the correct
definition or scope of Latin terminology. Rather, the language of the statute
is taken at face value. Therefore, if a contract expressly or implicitly indicates
a place of performance, then the contract should be governed by the laws of
that place. If no indication is made, then, and only then, should the place
where the contract was made control. Whether this approach is consistent with
the larger body of case law from other jurisdictions utilizing the lex loci
contractus rule is not resolved here. The purpose of this comment is to make
clear that title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes mandates that the law
of the place where the contract is to be performed controls the contract unless
there is no indication in the agreement of a place of performance.
The universe of contractual choice-of-law jurisprudence in Oklahoma can
be distilled into three categories — a general rule and two exceptions. Title
15, section 162 provides the general rule: “A contract is to be interpreted
according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if
it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law and usage of
the place where it is made.”15 While this rule controls the majority of
Oklahoma’s contractual choice-of-law disputes, there are two recognized
exceptions.

13. See Bohannan, ¶ 24, 820 P.2d at 795 (stating that section 162 is the statutory source of
the lex loci contractus rule); see also id. ¶ 17, 820 P.2d at 793 (stating the lex loci contractus
rule as “the nature, validity and interpretation of a contract is governed by the law where the
contract is made”).
14. See Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, ¶ 26, 796 P.2d 276, 287
(“Section 162 is not a declaration of the rule of lex loci contractus.”).
15. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001).
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The first exception was initially acknowledged by an Oklahoma court in
Collins Radio Co. v. Bell and involves contracts for the sale of goods under
Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code.16 The second exception was
established by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bohannan v. Allstate
Insurance Co. and applies to motor vehicle insurance contracts.17 For
simplicity, these two exceptions will be referred to as the “UCC exception”
and the “Bohannan exception,” respectively.18 These exceptions allow for the
utilization of the “most significant relationship” test from the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) in determining which law will govern the
contract.19 The “most significant relationship” test is not applicable to contract
disputes within the purview of the general statute,20 although it may be applied
in limited contexts, such as determining whether a contract’s choice-of-law
provision is enforceable.21
Oklahoma courts will recognize the parties’ selection of a particular state’s
law to control the agreement, whether explicit22 or implicit,23 as long as the
16. See 1980 OK CIV APP 57, ¶ 14, 623 P.2d 1039, 1045, cited with approval in
Bohannan, ¶ 24, 820 P.2d at 795; see also Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, ¶
12, 81 P.3d 618, 625. Oklahoma’s codification of the U.C.C. Article 2 is found at 12A OKLA.
STAT. §§ 2-101 et seq.
17. See Bohannan, ¶ 30, 820 P.2d at 797.
18. This comment focuses on the general rule; therefore, a detailed analysis of the U.C.C.
and Bohannan exceptions is not undertaken here, although Bohannan is lightly discussed in Part
II.A.4, infra. See Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, Choice of Law Under the Code, 8 OKLA. PRAC.,
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 4:7 (2009 ed.), for a more detailed explanation of Oklahoma’s
choice-of-law rules under the Uniform Commercial Code.
19. See Bohannan, ¶ 30, 820 P.2d at 797 (“The validity, interpretation, application and
effect of the provisions of a motor vehicle insurance contract should be determined in
accordance with the laws of the state in which the contract was made, unless those provisions
are contrary to the public policy of Oklahoma, or unless the facts demonstrate that another
jurisdiction has the most significant relationship with the subject matter and the parties.”)
(emphasis added); Ysbrand, ¶ 12, 81 P.3d at 625 (“The ‘most significant relationship’ test
applies to an action for breach of warranty in a sale of goods under Article 2 of the UCC.”).
20. See Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 14, 164 P.3d 1028, 103334 (holding that the general rule applies unless the contract falls into either the UCC or
Bohannan exceptions). But see Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, ¶¶ 9-30,
796 P.2d 276, 282-88 (applying the “most significant relationship” test as a secondary method
of analysis to reach the same conclusion as was reached applying title 15, section 162 of the
Oklahoma Statutes); MacDougall, supra note 18, § 4:7 (stating that there is doctrinal support
for practitioners to argue the “most significant relationship” approach in ordinary contract
cases).
21. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 1990 OK 67, ¶ 7, 796 P.2d 296, 299.
22. See, e.g., Carmack v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 1975 OK 77, 536 P.2d 897; see also
Webster, supra note 9, at 386.
23. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 1913 OK 162, ¶ 16, 132 P. 494, 497
(applying the law of Oklahoma to an agreement entered into in Kansas because there was a

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss1/2

2011]

COMMENT

21

selected law is not contrary to Oklahoma’s established public policy.24
Additionally, Oklahoma law will govern a contract that would otherwise be
controlled by another state’s law if the contract is repugnant to Oklahoma’s
established law or public policy.25
In order to resolve the question of which place of performance should
govern when a contract contemplates multiple places of performance and the
parties have not made a choice of law, it is important to first conduct a survey
of important cases in Oklahoma’s contractual choice-of-law jurisprudence in
order to illustrate the aforementioned rules and how they developed. Although
the cases appear to be inconsistent, a complete understanding of Oklahoma’s
contractual choice-of-law jurisprudence helps reconcile the “place of making”
and “place of performance” rules. Additionally, several deficiencies and
unresolved questions from the case law are illuminated.
A. Survey of Oklahoma Contractual Choice-of-Law Jurisprudence
The current form of title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes has
remained completely unchanged since before Oklahoma’s statehood.26 The
same cannot be said for the case law.27 There is “confusion” — noted by
commentators28 and realized by practitioners in this area of law — that has
continued forward into modern jurisprudence. In the following pages, selected
contractual choice-of-law cases will be grouped and discussed according to
common themes present in the opinions and by the date in which those cases
were decided.

clear manifestation of a mutual intention to apply Oklahoma law); see also Webster, supra note
9, at 386.
24. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., ¶ 6 n.12, 796 P.2d at 299 n.12 (stating that a choice-oflaw clause may be invalidated if: (a) application of the chosen law is “contrary to a fundamental
policy” of a state with a greater interest in the controversy, and (b) that state’s law would govern
absent a choice-of-law provision in the contract)(emphasis omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971)).
25. See Pate v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1982 OK CIV APP 36, ¶ 11, 649 P.2d 809, 811 (stating
that “general rule” does not apply if the law of that place is “contrary to the law or public policy
of the state” where enforcement is sought).
26. See STAT. 1890, § 864; R.L. 1910, § 956; COMP. STAT. § 5049 (1921) (“A contract is
to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if
it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place where
it is made.”).
27. It is interesting to note the lack of reference to the statutory directive for interpreting
contracts until 1926 in Turman Oil Co. v. Sapulpa Refining Co., 1926 OK 747, ¶ 5, 254 P. 84,
86 (per curiam) (citing COMP. STAT. § 5046 (1921)).
28. See, e.g., MacDougall, supra note 18, § 4:7 (“Oklahoma law is simply confused
regarding the choice-of-law theory in contract cases.”).
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1. The Foundational Cases and the Implied Intent of the Parties
According to one Oklahoma commentator, the “well-reasoned” choice-oflaw rules are those which inquire into the intent of the parties when selecting
which law will govern a contract.29 The first decisions in Oklahoma’s choiceof-law jurisprudence support this contention by hinging the selection of a
jurisdiction’s law on an inquiry into the “implied intent” of the parties.
In 1895, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma was faced with
the question of which law to apply to a chattel mortgage in the case of
Richardson v. Shelby.30 The question was whether the law of Kansas, where
the property was located at the time the chattel mortgage was executed,31 or the
law of Oklahoma, where the property was subsequently moved to,32 would
apply. The court concluded that Kansas law would govern the dispute and set
out the following rule: “The law is that the rights of the parties to a contract
are to be determined by the law as it exists in the state or country where the
contract is to be performed.”33 Because the mortgagor was a resident of
Kansas and the property being mortgaged was in Kansas at the time, the court
inferred that the contract “referenced” the law of Kansas.34
The court
concluded that by referencing the state of Kansas the parties had indicated that
Kansas was the place of performance.35 While not mentioning the “implied
intent of the parties” expressly, the court’s conclusion appears to find that the
parties intended for the law of Kansas to govern because of the domicile of the
parties and the locus of the land involved.
The next installment in the Territorial Court’s fledgling contractual choiceof-law jurisprudence came the following year in Jaffrey & Co. v. Wolf.36 The
question in that case revolved around a sale of goods to be shipped from New
York to Guthrie and Oklahoma City.37 The court found that New York’s law
should be applied because virtually the entire transaction — including
negotiation, payment and delivery — took place there.38 The court noted that
the defendants (buyers) took possession of the goods in New York City and
concluded the transaction was completed upon the seller’s delivery of the
goods to the railroad station.39 Another rule of law was set out by the court as
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See Webster, supra note 9, at 385, 389.
1895 OK 48, 41 P. 378.
See id. ¶¶ 3-4, 41 P. at 379-80.
See id. ¶ 4, 41 P. at 379-80
Id. ¶ 17, 41 P. at 380 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
1896 OK 73, 47 P. 496.
See id. ¶ 47, 47 P. at 502.
See id.
See id.
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follows: “[t]he rule is that the place of the contract governs the terms of the
contract, and will also govern as to all facts determining the maturity of the
amount due.”40
At first glance, the rules from Richardson and Jaffrey may appear to be in
conflict with each other. However, “the place of the contract” language used
by the court in Jaffrey does not necessarily mean “the place of making.”41
Rather, “the place of the contract” is a conclusion of which law will govern the
contract — sometimes the term is used to designate the place of making, and
sometimes it is used to reference the place of performance.42 In Jaffrey, the
distinction was moot because the place of performance and the place of
making were the same.43 The court’s emphasis on the completion of the sale
in New York, however, indicates that it did not intend for this rule to be
contrary to its prior pronouncement in Richardson.
In 1913, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma continued to apply the law of the
place of performance, albeit with a new twist which introduced into
Oklahoma’s jurisprudence a more rigid rule originating from neither the statute
nor previous Oklahoma case decisions.44 Atchison, T. & S. F. Railway Co. v.
Smith was a case involving a free train pass for roundtrip travel between
Wellington, Kansas, and Perry, Oklahoma.45 The pass contained a provision
that was signed by the plaintiff disclaiming liability for accidental injury.46
The plaintiff was injured on the trip and sought damages for personal injury.47
Kansas law would have invalidated the provision and allowed the plaintiff to
recover; Oklahoma law would uphold the agreement’s validity.48
The court concluded the law of Oklahoma should govern the contract for
two reasons.49 First, Oklahoma was the place where the contract was to be
“principally performed” because most of the journey occurred there.50 Second,
Oklahoma law should govern the agreement because the parties were
presumed to have intended that their engagement be valid.51
40. Id. ¶ 48, 47 P. at 502 (emphasis added).
41. See id. This illusion of conflict is doubtless spurred by the countless and varied judicial
interpretations of “lex loci contractus.”
42. See Sec. Trust & Savs. Bank v. Gleichmann, 150 P. 908, 911 (Okla. 1915) (per curiam).
43. See Jaffrey, ¶¶ 47-48, 47 P. at 502.
44. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 1913 OK 162, 132 P. 494.
45. See id. ¶ 2, 132 P. at 495.
46. See id.
47. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 132 P. at 495.
48. See id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 132 P. at 495-96.
49. See id. ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496.
50. See id. Wellington is only a “short distance north of the Oklahoma border” while Perry
is over 50 miles south of the state line. Id. ¶ 2, 132 P. at 495.
51. See id. ¶ 10, 132 P. at 496.
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In looking to these factors, the court seemed most concerned with the intent
of the parties at the time of contracting.52 Absent this implied intent, the court
stated that it would have to resort to the “legal fiction” that the law of the place
where the contract was made should be looked to in order to determine its
validity.53 In fact, the court articulated a rule quite distinct from any used
previously in the state:54
[C]ontracts are to be governed as to their nature, and their validity,
and their interpretation, by the laws of the place where they were
made, unless the parties when entering into the contract clearly
manifest a mutual intention that it shall be governed by the laws of
some other state or country.55
While the ultimate holding did not rest on this rule, the concept that the nature,
validity, and interpretation of a contract are to be governed by the place of
making has persisted in Oklahoma’s case law.56
In Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Gleichmann,57 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court continued to give effect to the “presumed intention” of the parties when
it determined that two bank notes were to be governed by the laws of Iowa
instead of Oklahoma.58 It also continued to resolve contractual conflict-of-law
questions without reference to the statute directing which law should govern.59
Although there was a factual dispute about where the notes were actually
executed,60 the court largely disregarded this detail and held the implied intent

52. See id. ¶¶ 9-16, 132 P. at 496-97.
53. See id. ¶ 9, 132 P. at 496.
54. In his note as part of the 1965 Conflict of Laws Symposium, Kenneth Webster referred
to the “place of making” approach as the “oldest and most rigid view.” See Webster, supra note
9, at 385. While this is an accurate statement from the perspective of the country as a whole,
it is not so for Oklahoma’s jurisprudence. Webster cites only one case predating Atchison, and
that case does not apply the “place of making” rule in the way Webster contemplates. See id.
(citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pratt, 1907 OK 43, ¶ 0, 89 P. 237, 237). Rather, the contract in
question in Pratt was stipulated as “an Indian Territory contract” and the court determined that
the laws applicable to Indian Territory at the time the contract was made were incorporated into
the contract. See W. Union Tel. Co., ¶ 3, 89 P. at 237.
55. Atchison, ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496 (citing Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co.,
129 U.S. 397 (1889) (emphasis added)).
56. See, e.g., Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; Telex
Corp. v. Hamilton, 1978 OK 32, ¶ 8, 576 P.2d 767, 768; Clark v. First Nat’l Bank, 1916 OK
404, ¶ 9, 157 P. 96, 98 (per curiam).
57. 150 P. 908 (1915) (per curiam).
58. See id. at 911.
59. See id. at 910-11.
60. See id. at 909.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss1/2

2011]

COMMENT

25

of the parties was for the law of Iowa to govern because the notes were to be
performed there.61
Interestingly, the court held that a contract which is made in one place but
is to be performed in another should be governed by the law of the place of
performance “as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation.”62 This
articulation of the rule stands in stark contrast to the rule previously espoused
in Atchison.63 Both holdings focused on the “presumed” or “implied” intent
of the parties at the time of contracting. However, if the court had applied the
rule from Atchison — that the place of making governs a contract absent a
clear manifestation of mutual intent by the parties that another law
governs64 — to the facts in Gleichmann, it would have likely reached a
contrary result. At trial, a jury found that the notes were executed in Okarche,
Oklahoma, to the Hart-Parr company, as the defendant contended.65 If the jury
also agreed with Gleichmann that the notes were made and delivered in
Oklahoma, it is very plausible that they would not have found an implied
intention for Iowa law to govern.66 Applying the Atchison rule, Oklahoma law
would have governed the bank notes because it was the place of making.67

61. See id. at 911.
62. Id.; see also Legg v. Midland Savs. & Loan Co., 1916 OK 46, ¶ 3, 154 P. 682, 684 (per
curiam) (“[C]ontracts made in one place to be performed in another are governed by the law of
the place of performance . . . .”).
63. Compare Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 1913 OK 162, ¶ 8, 132 P. 494, 496
(“[C]ontracts are to be governed as to their nature, and their validity, and their interpretation,
by the laws of the place where they were made . . . .”), with Gleichmann, 150 P. at 911 (holding
that the bank notes should be governed by the law of the place of performance as to their
“validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation”).
64. See Atchison, ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496.
65. See Gleichmann, 150 P. at 909-10. This conclusion is inferred from the fact that the
jury found in favor of Gleichmann at trial based upon the trial judge’s instruction that the notes
were an Oklahoma contract if the jury found them to have been executed in Oklahoma.
66. But cf. id. at 908 (stating in the Syllabus by the court that the notes should be governed
by the law of Iowa in part because Iowa law would recognize the notes as negotiable). First,
this holding only occurs in the Syllabus by the court and does not merit discussion in the actual
opinion. Second, it seems that “negotiable” here does not mean “valid” but rather implies a
sense of transferability after being issued. However, it may be the case that the parties are
presumed to have intended the notes to be negotiable, similar to how the parties in Atchison
were presumed to intend the exculpatory clause to be valid.
67. This would be true unless the Court were to view the rule in Gleichmann as a means
of determining the implied intent of the parties for purposes of the rule articulated in Atchison.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

26

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:17

2. Clark and Telex Corp.: The Misunderstood Cases
The two cases discussed here are often cited by Oklahoma courts for the
rule that “the nature, validity, and interpretation of a contract are governed by
the law” of the place where the contract was made.68 However, while that rule
is reflected in these decisions, neither holding rested upon it. Therefore,
formalistic application of this “place of making” rule is misguided.
A year after deciding Gleichmann, the Oklahoma Supreme Court entered
an opinion in Clark v. First National Bank,69 which provided for a three-tiered
analysis of which law would govern a contract.70 The court stated:
The general rule of law is, that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation, and the validity of a contract are determined by the
law of the place where the contract is made; matters connected with
its performance are regulated by the law of the place of
performance; matters respecting the remedy depend upon the law
of the place where the remedy is sought to be enforced.71
The court subsequently noted that “[t]he first and second rules may be open to
some criticism, but the third is universally admitted to be true.”72
At issue in Clark was whether the plaintiff (the bank) pursued the proper
remedy in foreclosing on its chattel mortgage.73 The court ultimately
concluded that the bank did pursue an appropriate remedy and dismissed
Clark’s contention that Illinois law should govern the issue.74
No discussion was given to the first two tiers of the “general rule” that the
court set out in the opinion, and the holding in no way rested upon them.75 In
fact, as mentioned previously, the court even stated that there is some
discrepancy as to their acceptance.76 Nevertheless, Oklahoma courts have

68. See Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; see, e.g.,
Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 14 n.22, 164 P.3d 1028, 1033-34 n.22.
69. 1916 OK 404, 157 P. 96 (per curiam).
70. See id. ¶ 9, 157 P. at 98.
71. Id.
72. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted); contra Webster, supra note 9, at 388-89 (stating
that such a contention “is definitely incapable of any support from the better-reasoned choice
of law theories”).
73. See Clark, 1916 OK 404, ¶ 13, 157 P. at 99.
74. See id. ¶ 14, 157 P. at 99 (determining that the law of Kansas, where the foreclosure
was sought, governed as to whether the foreclosure was appropriate instead of the law of
Illinois, where the chattel mortgage was executed).
75. See id. ¶¶ 9-14, 157 P. at 98-99.
76. See id. ¶ 9, 157 P. at 98.
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continued to cite Clark for the proposition that the place of making governs
with respect to a contract’s nature, validity, and interpretation.77
After Clark, the Oklahoma Supreme Court temporarily reverted to using
“the place of performance” rule.78 However, in Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court revived the rule from Clark.79 At issue was
whether the law of Oklahoma or the law of Florida governed a contract
whereby the plaintiff, a resident of Florida, agreed to represent the defendant,
a Tulsa corporation, in negotiations with one of its “lost” debtors.80 The
plaintiff was to receive 25% of any amount collected up to $25,000.81 The
court first noted that the contract itself provided that Oklahoma law would
apply.82 Furthermore, the contract was entered into in Oklahoma and was to
be performed in Oklahoma.83 Additionally, the court found that Oklahoma law
would apply absent a choice-of-law provision in the contract and stated “the
general rule of law is that the law where the contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature, validity, and interpretation.”84
Despite its previous recognition of section 162 in Paclawski v. Bristol
Laboratories, Inc.,85 the court decided this choice-of-law question without
reference to the statute.86 However, the outcome would not have been
different because, as the court mentioned, the contract was performed in
Oklahoma.87 Additionally, this decision acknowledged that parties can include
a choice-of-law provision in their contract88 and contemplated that a contract
provision could be void if violative of Oklahoma’s public policy.89
Telex Corp. is not particularly significant because of its holding — nothing
in the court’s conclusion was inconsistent with its prior precedent. However,
77. See, e.g., Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; Telex
Corp. v. Hamilton, 1978 OK 32, ¶ 8, 576 P.2d 767, 768.
78. See, e.g., Collins v. Holland, 1934 OK 404, ¶ 15, 34 P.2d 587, 588 (per curiam) (“[T]he
law of the place where a contract is to be performed is the law which governs in determining
its validity.”).
79. See 1978 OK 32, ¶ 8, 576 P.2d at 768.
80. See id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 576 P.2d at 768.
81. See id. ¶ 4, 576 P.2d at 768.
82. Id. ¶ 7, 576 P.2d at 768.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 8, 576 P.2d at 768 (citing Clark v. First Nat’l Bank, 157 P. 96, 98 (Okla. 1916)
(per curiam)) (emphasis added).
85. See 1967 OK 21, ¶ 5, 425 P.2d 452, 453-54 (per curiam).
86. See generally Telex Corp., 1978 OK 32, 576 P.2d 767.
87. See id. ¶ 7, 576 P.2d at 768.
88. See id. ¶ 8, 576 P.2d at 768; see also Carmack v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 1975 OK
77, ¶ 8, 536 P.2d 897, 899 (“[A] contract may provide the choice of law under which it is to be
governed . . . .”).
89. See Telex Corp., ¶ 10, 76 P.2d at 768-69.
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the language of the rule articulated in Telex Corp., which was derived from the
holding in Clark, is inconsistent with a majority of the court’s prior decisions.
Subsequent court opinions have cited Telex Corp. as setting the rule that
contracts are to be governed by the law of the place of making.90 A rigid
application of this rule is not accurate when considering the court’s prior
emphasis on the intent of the parties and the place of performance, the facts
upon which Telex Corp. was decided, and the plain language of title 15,
section 162 of the Oklahoam Statutes.
3. Cases Relying on Section 162 and Emphasizing the Place of
Performance Rule
In Monahan v. New York Life Insurance Co.,91 the federal district court for
the Western District of Oklahoma was tasked with deciding whether several
life insurance policies were governed by the laws of New York, where the
policies were to be performed,92 or Arkansas, their place of making.93 The
court first articulated the “well established rule” that matters bearing on a
contract’s performance are governed by the law of the place of performance;
matters concerning the remedy by the law of the forum; and matters relating
to the execution, interpretation, and validity of a contract by the law of the
place of making.94 This rule is identical to the one expressed by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Clark v. First National Bank,95 although the district court
paid no homage to that decision. Instead, the district court utilized the place
of performance rule after it recognized that pursuant to the Erie doctrine it
must apply the law of the state in which it sits when determining choice-of-law
issues.96 Citing section 5047 of the 1931 Oklahoma Compiled Statutes,97 the
district court concluded that “the law of the place of contract, lex loci

90. E.g., Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; Pate v. MFA
Mut. Ins. Co., 1982 OK CIV APP 36, ¶ 11, 649 P.2d 809, 811.
91. 26 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Okla. 1939), aff’d, 108 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1939).
92. The life insurance policies were to be performed in New York because they were made
payable, on their face, at the insurance company’s home office in New York, New York. See
id. at 861.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See 1916 OK 404, ¶ 9, 157 P. 96, 98 (per curiam).
96. See Monahan, 26 F. Supp. at 861-62.
97. Compare id., with 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001). Both the 1931 and 2001 version state:
“A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be
performed, or, if it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law and usage of
the place where it is made.” See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162; COMP. STAT. § 9470 (1931).
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contractus, must yield to the law of the place of performance, although it may
be contrary to the established principles of common law and usage.”98
Although one Oklahoma court had cited the statute previously,99 Monahan
is the first time any court undertook a choice-of-law analysis using the text of
Oklahoma’s choice-of-law statute.100
In making its choice-of-law
determination, the district court only referenced the statute and disregarded
Oklahoma’s case law.101
In 1944, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit likewise
applied title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes102 to a dispute over a
crop-share lease executed in Arkansas where the leased land was located in
Sequoyah County, Oklahoma.103 In McCraw v. Simpson, the court determined
Oklahoma law should govern the crop-share lease because the land was
located in Oklahoma and, therefore, the lease was to be performed in
Oklahoma.104 Additionally, the court noted that such an outcome is not
inconsistent with Oklahoma case law,105 something the district court in
Monahan neglected to do. Similar to Monahan, however, there is no mention
of the three-tiered rule from Clark v. First National Bank or the cases citing
it.106
98. Monahan, 26 F. Supp. at 862. But see Consol. Flour Mills Co. v. File Bros. Wholesale
Co., 110 F.2d 926, 927-29 (10th Cir. 1940) (citing, inter alia, Clark, ¶ 9, 157 P. at 98, for the
rule that a contract’s nature, validity, and interpretation are governed by the law of the place of
its making unless it appears that the parties intended to be bound by the law of another place).
Despite using the Clark rule, this decision is not out of line with the Oklahoma statute because
the flour was to be manufactured in the state of Kansas and the contract’s express terms
provided that delivery of the flour to the carrier would constitute delivery to the File brothers;
therefore, performance was to occur in Kansas. See id. at 929.
99. See Turman Oil Co. v. Sapulpa Refining Co., 1926 OK 747, ¶ 13, 254 P. 84, 87 (per
curiam) (citing COMP. STAT. § 5049 (1921) for the rule “that a contract is to be interpreted [by]
the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed.”). Section 5049 of the 1921
compiled statutes is identical in language to the form of 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162. Compare
COMP. STAT. § 5049 (1921), with 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001). However, in Turman Oil Co.
the statute was not used in a choice-of-law context but rather was cited as an interpretive device
with emphasis on the word “usage.” See Turman Oil Co., ¶ 13, 254 P. at 87.
100. See Monahan, 26 F. Supp. at 862.
101. See id. (discussing a case from the federal district court for the Southern District of
California which applied an identical statute and reached the same conclusion).
102. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (1941). The 1941 main volume is the first volume of statutes
utilizing the title-and-section designation.
103. See McCraw v. Simpson, 141 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir. 1944).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing, inter alia, Sec. Trust & Savs. Bank v. Gleichmann, 150 P. 908 (1915) (per
curiam)).
106. Compare id., with Consol. Flour Mills v. File Bros. Wholesale Co., 110 F.2d 926, 929
(10th Cir. 1940) (applying the rule from Clark v. First Nat’l Bank, 1916 OK 404, 157 P. 96 (per
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It is worth noting that up until the late 1960s, there were no Oklahoma state
court decisions which rested upon, or even mentioned, the choice-of-law
statute when deciding a choice-of-law issue. The two cases discussed
immediately above were both decided by federal courts applying Oklahoma
law. However, this state of affairs changed in 1967 when the Oklahoma
Supreme Court entered its decision in Paclawski v. Bristol Laboratories,
Inc.107
In Paclawski, the contract in question was a settlement agreement on an
underlying tort claim against the developer of a prescription drug, among other
defendants.108 There was no dispute between the parties that Arkansas law
governed the contract, but the court took the time to mention that the contract
was “executed and performed” in Arkansas and cited, inter alia, title 15,
section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes.109
In 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided a case of significant
importance to the thesis of this comment because the case involved a contract
which indicated two places of performance.110 In Panama Processes v. Cities
Service Co., the court was faced with determining whether New York or
Brazilian law applied to an agreement between a minority shareholder
(plaintiff) and the majority shareholder (defendant) of a Brazilian
corporation.111 The contract in question was a letter of agreement negotiated
and signed in New York which provided the plaintiff with assurances from the
defendant concerning the future operational policies of the Brazilian
corporation, including the payment of dividends.112
Justice Opala, writing for the majority, conducted a two-tiered choice-oflaw analysis finding that Brazilian law should govern the agreement.113 The
first tier of the analysis was grounded upon the text of title 15, section 162 of
the Oklahoma Statutes whereby the law of the place of making would govern
curiam), to a contract for the purchase of flour).
107. 1967 OK 21, 425 P.2d 452 (per curiam).
108. See id. ¶¶ 1-2, 425 P.2d at 453.
109. See id. ¶ 5, 425 P.2d at 453-54. It is unclear from the opinion what constitutes
performance in a settlement agreement, but it stands to reason that performance and execution
are one and the same because there is a giving-up of the rights to a lawsuit in exchange for
money. However, it may be the case that if the agreement had designated a different location
as the place of payment of the settlement money, then that location might be considered the
place of performance.
110. See Panama Processess v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 276, 287-88.
The only other Oklahoma case that chooses one place of performance over another is Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith. See 1913 OK 162, ¶ 8, 132 P. 494, 496.
111. See 1990 OK 66, ¶ 2, 796 P.2d at 278-79.
112. Id. ¶ 2, 796 P.2d at 279.
113. See id. ¶ 1, 726 P.2d at 276.
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only if there was no indication in the contract where performance was to
occur.114 Justice Opala was very critical of the notion that section 162 was an
embodiment of the common law rule of lex loci contractus, and instead
emphasized that lex loci solutionis, the law of the place of performance, was
the default rule in Oklahoma.115
The court concluded that the letter agreement did indicate that “the contract
was to be performed in major part in Brazil” because the corporation’s future
expansion and dividend distribution had to occur in Brazil and the agreement
was by its own terms subject to the business climate in Brazil.116 The court
noted, however, that some performance under the agreement had to occur in
New York because New York was defendant’s principal place of business and
decisions concerning the agreement would be made at that place.117 These
decisions were considered insignificant when compared with the performance
which had to occur in Brazil because the agreement indicated that the parties
intended for the law of Brazil to govern the validity and enforcement of the
contract.118 Significant to the court’s opinion here was not only the emphasis
on the text of title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes, but also the
conclusion that the parties intended for Brazil law to govern.119
The second tier of the court’s analysis was to determine which place had the
“most significant relationship” to the parties and the transaction.120 The court
concluded that Brazil had the most significant relationship to the transaction
because of the agreement’s conflict with Brazilian law.121 However, before
conducting its analysis the court noted that it was not expressing an opinion
on whether the “most significant relationship” test should apply; rather, it just
concluded that even if it did, Brazil law would still govern the letter
agreement.122 A detailed examination of the court’s analysis here is
unwarranted because the court entered a later opinion which explicitly held

114. See id. ¶ 26, 796 P.2d at 287.
115. See id.; contra Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1417, 1420 n.5 (10th Cir.
1985); Webster, supra note 9, at 385 (stating that Oklahoma’s “place of making” and “place of
performance” rules are embodied in section 162).
116. See Panama Processess v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 276, 288.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. This was the first inquiry by an Oklahoma state court into the implied intent of
the parities since Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Gleichmann. See 150 P. 908 (1915) (per
curiam).
120. See Panama Processes, ¶ 28, 796 P.2d at 288.
121. Id. ¶ 30 n.52, 796 P.2d at 288 n.52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 188(2) cmt. e (1971)).
122. See id. ¶ 28 n.50, 796 P.2d at 288 n.50.
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that the “most significant relationship” test does not apply to general contract
choice-of-law disputes.123
4. Motor Vehicle Insurance Contracts and the Bohannan Exception
Motor Vehicle Insurance contracts present unique choice-of-law difficulties
because of the mobility of automobiles and the varying legislation of the
several states.124 As a result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has established a
choice-of-law rule specifically applicable to these contracts.125 This rule
applies the law of the place where the contract was made unless: 1) Provisions
of the contract are contrary to Oklahoma public policy, or 2) Another
jurisdiction is demonstrated to have “the most significant relationship with the
subject matter and the parties.”126 Most of the motor vehicle insurance cases
following Bohannan v. Allstate Insurance Co., where this exception was
established, have focused on the scope and operation of the public policy
exception.127
This comment does not engage in an analysis of motor vehicle insurance
cases following Bohannan because their choice-of-law questions are resolved
by the aforementioned exception. However, the two cases leading up to the
Bohannan decision are useful because they fell within the purview of the
general rule embodied in title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes at the
time they were decided.128 Additionally, Bohannan helps to identify choiceof-law questions left unresolved by the Oklahoma courts and is otherwise
seminal to Oklahoma’s choice-of-law jurisprudence; therefore, a comment on
these rules would be incomplete without including a brief discussion on
Bohannan.129
In 1982, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals was tasked with determining
whether an automobile insurance policy which contained a subrogation clause
was governed by the law of Oklahoma or Arkansas.130 In Pate v. MFA Mutual
Insurance Co., the plaintiff/insured was a resident of Arkansas who had
obtained an automobile insurance policy in that state.131 Plaintiff and his
123. See Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 14, 164 P.3d 1028, 103334.
124. See Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 25, 820 P.2d 787, 795.
125. See id. ¶ 30, 820 P.2d at 797.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Burgess v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 OK CIV APP 85, ¶¶ 6-13,
16-18, 77 P.3d 612, 613-15.
128. See generally Pate v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1982 OK CIV APP 36, 649 P.2d 809; Rhody
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985).
129. See generally Bohannan, 1991 OK 64, 820 P.2d 787.
130. See Pate, ¶¶ 9-10, 649 P.2d at 811.
131. See id. ¶ 2, 649 P.2d at 810.
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family were involved in an accident on Interstate 35 near Davis, Oklahoma,
and brought this suit to recover approximately $4,000 from his insurance
company (defendant) subsequent to settling with the third-party tortfeasor.132
The defendant refused payment based upon a provision in the policy that
provided the insurer with a right of reimbursement or “set-off” equal to any
amount recovered from third parties.133 The set-off provision was valid under
Arkansas law; however, Oklahoma had a statute invalidating all such
provisions which are “effective in this state.”134
The precise issue before the court was whether the set-off provision was
contrary to Oklahoma public policy in a way sufficient to justify the
application of Oklahoma law to a contract that would otherwise be governed
by the law of Arkansas.135 In reaching its decision, the court of appeals cited
Telex Corp. v. Hamilton136 and Clark v. First National Bank137 for the rule that
a contract will be governed by the laws of the state where it was made unless
either agreed to by the parties or “contrary to the law or public policy of the
state where enforcement of the contract is attempted.”138 The court concluded
that the Oklahoma legislature intended for the subrogation limitation statute
to apply to all vehicles traveling on Oklahoma highways; therefore, the
provision in the insurance policy violated Oklahoma law and was deemed
invalid.139
In conducting its analysis in Pate, the court of appeals made no reference
to the statutory directive in title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and
it avoided an inquiry into the place where the insurance policy was to be
performed.140 Performance for an automobile insurance policy might be
considered the place where the premiums or benefits are paid.141 However, it
132. See id. ¶¶ 3-5, 649 P.2d at 810.
133. See id. ¶ 6, 649 P.2d at 810.
134. See id. ¶ 7, 649 P.2d at 810-11 (citing 36 OKLA. STAT. § 6092 (1981)).
135. See id. ¶¶ 8, 11-14, 649 P.2d at 811-12.
136. 1978 OK 32, 576 P.2d 767.
137. 1916 OK 404, 157 P. 96 (per curiam).
138. Pate, ¶ 11, 649 P.2d at 811. Additionally, the court noted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF C ONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) and set out section 6, but it did not engage in any analysis
dependent upon that section or inquire which place had “the most significant relationship” to
the dispute. See generally id. ¶¶ 12-13, 649 P.2d at 811.
139. Pate, ¶¶ 14-15, 649 P.2d at 812 (relying in part on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. b (1971)).
140. See id. ¶¶ 11-14, 649 P.2d at 811-12. It is interesting to note that the court quoted
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment a, stating: “The court must apply
a local statutory provision directed to choice of law provided that it would be constitutional to
do so.” Id. ¶ 13, 649 P.2d at 811. Despite this language in the comment, the court neglected
to make any reference to Oklahoma’s statutory directive. See id.
141. Cf. Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1985) (“In the
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may also be the case under Oklahoma law that the parties to such a policy do
not contemplate a place of performance when entering into the agreement; or
that they have not “indicated” one within the meaning of section 162 without
an express designation.142
In Rhody v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit was tasked
with applying Oklahoma’s choice-of-law rules to an automobile insurance
policy.143 The plaintiffs/insured were residents of Texas and held a Texas
insurance policy that covered three vehicles.144 One of the covered vehicles
was garaged in Oklahoma by their son, an Oklahoma resident.145 This vehicle
was involved in an accident in Oklahoma with an uninsured Oklahoma
driver.146 This dispute arose when the plaintiffs tried to claim that Oklahoma
law governed the contract and entitled them to stack the
uninsured/underinsured motorist (hereinafter “UM”) coverage for each of their
three vehicles for total recovery of $30,000 from the defendant insurer.147
Defendant maintained that Texas law applied because the policy was executed
there; Texas did not stack UM benefits and recovery would be limited to
$10,000.148
Two choice-of-law issues were presented to the Tenth Circuit for
determination in this case.149 The first was whether Oklahoma was trending
away from the lex loci contractus rule in favor of the more modern “most
significant relationship” test.150 The Tenth Circuit deferred to the district
context of insurance policies, we have held that the specification of a place for payment of
premiums and benefits under the policy signifies the parties’ designation of that location as the
place of performance of the contract.”). While Rhody looked to payment of benefits and
premiums to determine place of performance, there is no reason that each could not
independently suffice as a place of performance. The contract could then specify multiple
places of performance, and conflicts would be resolved according to the proposal made later in
this article.
142. See infra Part IID for discussion regarding the possible constructions of the term
“interpretation” in section 162.
143. 771 F.2d 1416, 1417 (10th Cir. 1985).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1417-18.
148. See id. at 1418.
149. See id. at 1418-20.
150. Id. at 1418. Plaintiffs argued that the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s adoption of the “most
significant relationship” test for tort conflict-of-laws determinations in Brickner v. Gooden,
1974 OK 91, 525 P.2d 632, coupled with the court of appeal’s decision to apply the same test
to disputes under the U.C.C in Collins Radio Co. v. Bell, 1980 OK CIV APP 57, 623 P.2d 1039,
demonstrated a shift toward applying the “most significant relationship” test to all choice-of-law
disputes. See Rhody, 771 F.2d at 1418.
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court’s determination that Oklahoma had not adopted the “most significant
relationship” test for general contract disputes.151
The second issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the insurance
policy indicated a place of performance sufficient to preempt the application
of the law of the place of making.152 The court concluded that Texas law
applied because there was no indication in the contract of where performance
was to occur, nor was there any indication, express or implied, that the parties
intended for a certain law to govern.153 In reaching this conclusion, the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the place of performance for the policy
was “the place where the liability of the uninsured motorist is determined.”154
The Tenth Circuit recognized both the existence of title 15, section 162 of
the Oklahoma Statutes and Oklahoma’s varied case law applying both the
“place of performance” and “place of making” rules.155 However, the court
indicated that the case law was mostly consistent with the statute despite not
appearing to utilize it.156
Bohannan v. Allstate Insurance Co.157 changed Oklahoma’s choice-of-law
landscape significantly. The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered a certified
question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.158 The
precise issue was whether a California automobile insurance contract that
allowed the insurer to subtract from its UM liability the amount received by
the insured from third-party tortfeasors was governed by the law of California
or Oklahoma when Oklahoma was the place enforcement was sought and had
a statute which expressly provided that UM coverage was not to be subrogated
by recovery of other UM money.159 The court held that the California contract
must be consistent with the public policy of Oklahoma and, therefore, the
subrogation provision was unenforceable to the extent that it allowed the
insurer a set-off against UM coverage that was purchased pursuant to an
Oklahoma policy.160
151. See id. at 1419.
152. See id. at 1419-20.
153. See id. at 1420.
154. Id. at 1419-20 (relying on Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 601 P.2d 20 (Mont. 1979), which
interpreted an identical statute and concluded that the insurance company had contemplated
performance in any state).
155. See id. at 1418, 1420.
156. See id. at 1420 n.5 (“While many Oklahoma cases do not appear to rest directly on the
statute, the majority follow the rule it embodies.”).
157. 1991 OK 64, 820 P.2d 787.
158. See id. ¶ 6, 820 P.2d at 790.
159. See id. ¶¶ 7, 12, 820 P.2d at 790-92 (citing 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3636 (1981)).
160. See id. ¶ 31, 820 P.2d at 797. But see Burgess v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003
OK CIV APP 85, ¶ 13, 77 P.3d 612, 614 (holding that the anti-stacking provision of two Kansas
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Based on earlier Oklahoma decisions providing for a public policy
exception to the general rule,161 this outcome is not surprising. However, the
significance of the decision stems from the rule articulated by the court:
The validity, interpretation, application and effect of the provisions
of a motor vehicle insurance contract should be determined in
accordance with the laws of the state in which the contract was
made, unless those provisions are contrary to the public policy of
Oklahoma, or unless the facts demonstrate that another jurisdiction
has the most significant relationship with the subject matter and the
parties.162
The court cited Telex Corp. v. Hamilton and Clark v. First National Bank for
the general rule163 and acknowledged title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma
Statutes as “the statutory source of the lex loci contractus and the lex loci
solutionis rules [that] remain a part of our law in ordinary contract cases.”164
However, the court noted that motor vehicle insurance contracts are “in a class
by themselves” and concluded that the established rule does not allow for
sufficient consideration to be given to the statutes and public policies of the
several states.165 Therefore, the court concluded, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws’ “most significant relationship” test should be available.166
It is interesting that the court expanded its choice-of-law rule in Bohannan
when it seems to have been able to reach the same result without incorporating

policies could not violate Oklahoma public policy because there was no Oklahoma policy
implicated); Herren v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 OK CIV APP 82, ¶ 17, 26 P.3d 120,
123 (holding that Bohannan did not invalidate provisions in an insurance policy that subrogated
UM coverage; there was no Oklahoma policy involved). These two court of appeals cases
demonstrate that Oklahoma courts will not allow a plaintiff covered only by foreign insurance
policies to use Oklahoma’s public policy to get more than they have contracted for. Rather, the
Bohannan decision was meant to protect injured plaintiffs who were covered by an Oklahoma
policy from having coverage that they contracted for under Oklahoma law subrogated by a
foreign insurance contract.
161. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 1990 OK 67, ¶ 6, 796 P.2d 296, 299; Legg
v. Midland Savs. & Loan Co., 1916 OK 46, ¶ 3, 154 P. 682, 684 (per curiam); Pate v. MFA
Mut. Ins., 1982 OK CIV APP 36, ¶ 11, 649 P.2d 808, 811.
162. Bohannan, ¶ 30, 820 P.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
163. See id. ¶ 17, 820 P.2d at 793.
164. See id. ¶ 24, 820 P.2d at 795.
165. See id. ¶ 25, 820 P.2d at 795.
166. See id. ¶ 30, 820 P.2d at 797; see also id. ¶ 27 n.5, 820 P.2d at 796 n.5 (“[T]he most
significant relationship test should be available where the facts demonstrate that the lex loci
contractus rule is insufficient to protect the fundamental law of the forum and the rights of the
parties.”).
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the “most significant relationship” test.167 None of the court’s analysis on
whether the California insurance policy was consistent with Oklahoma’s
public policy relied upon a determination of the state with the “most
significant relationship.”168 Rather, the Restatement (Second) was used as
persuasive authority for when the public policy exception can be invoked.169
Also significant is the broad language used by the court when stating that
“most significant relationship” test should be made available.170 While it has
so far been clear that the Bohannan rule does not extend beyond the bounds
of motor vehicle insurance policies,171 the same rationale could hold in other
scenarios involving competing state interests.
In addition, while the Bohannan court references title 15, section 162 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, it does not conduct any discussion on where the insurance
contract is to be performed.172 However, what seems to result from Pate and
Rhody is that Oklahoma courts seem unwilling to recognize that an automobile
insurance contract can indicate a place of performance absent a specific
designation of such a place in the contract.173 Whether this construction
applies to all contractual choice-of-law determinations under section 162
remains an open question.174

167. Cf. id. ¶¶ 17, 19-21, 820 P.2d at 793-94 (citing Pate v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1982 OK
CIV APP 36, 649 P.2d 809, with approval when applying the public policy exception to the lex
loci contractus rule).
168. See id. ¶¶ 26-31, 820 P.2d at 795-97.
169. See id. ¶¶ 26-30, 820 P.2d at 795-97; see also Pate, ¶¶ 12-14, 649 P.2d at 811-12 (using
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) to determine when the public policy
exception can be invoked but not inquiring into which state has the most significant relationship
to the issues at bar).
170. See id. ¶ 27 n.5, 820 P.2d at 796 n.5.
171. See Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 14, 164 P.3d 1028, 1034.
172. See Bohannan, ¶¶ 17-31, 820 P.2d at 793-97.
173. See also Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1985)
(“Because no place of performance is indicated, the law of the place where the policy was made
must govern . . . .”); Burgess v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 OK CIV APP 85, ¶ 19,
77 P.3d 612, 615 (“In the absence of evidence establishing the Kansas policies provided for a
place of performance, we interpret the contracts according to the law and usage of the place
where they were made . . . .”). The Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma Court of Appeals cases seem
more analytically sound than the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s rationale in Bohannan because
those courts look first for a place of performance and only look at the place where the contract
was made if none is found. See, e.g., id. This is more obedient to the plain text of title 15,
section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes and the court’s earlier pronouncement in Panama
Processes v. Cities Service Co.. See generally 1990 OK 66, 796 P.2d 276; 15 OKLA. STAT. §
162 (2001).
174. See infra Part IID for more discussion on this and other issues unresolved by Oklahoma
choice-of-law cases.
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5. Harvell v. Goodyear: Limiting Bohannan
Fifteen years after deciding Bohannan, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
confirmed that its holding in Bohannan would not extend outside the context
of motor vehicle insurance contracts.175 In Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., the court overturned a trial court’s certification of a class action lawsuit
brought by consumers from approximately thirty-seven states who had their
vehicles serviced by Goodyear since 1998.176 The determination turned in
large part on whether Oklahoma would apply more than one state’s substantive
law to the service contracts.177 The court held that because Oklahoma’s lex
loci contractus rule would require the trial court to apply the law of each state
where service was performed, the class would be unmanageable.178
The court began its choice-of-law analysis by rejecting the trial court’s
conclusion that the “most significant relationship” test applied.179 The court
acknowledged that the Restatement (Second)’s test had been approved for
application in the context of motor vehicle insurance contracts and contracts
for the sale of goods under the U.C.C; however, it stated that neither of those
exceptions were involved in a dispute over automobile service agreements.180
Although the court stated that the rule from Telex Corp. v. Hamilton and Clark
v. First National Bank (providing that the place of making governs a contract)
was the general rule,181 it started its analysis with a determination of the place
of performance of each of the contracts.182 The court then analyzed the
agreements by the text of title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes and
found that because each service agreement was to be performed at the place
where the service was rendered, the law of each of those places would govern
the service agreements, thus making the class unmanageable.183
B. Reconciling Two Apparent Lines of Cases
As previously shown, many Oklahoma decisions do not rest directly on the
statutory directive found in title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes.184

175. See Harvell, ¶ 14, 164 P.3d at 1033-34.
176. See id. ¶¶ 1, 5, 164 P.3d at 1030-31.
177. See id. ¶ 13, 164 P.3d at 1033.
178. See id. ¶¶ 15-16, 164 P.3d at 1034-35.
179. See id. ¶ 14, 164 P.3d at 1033-34.
180. See id.
181. See id. (“[T]he established choice of law rule in contract actions known as lex loci
contractus is that, unless the contract terms provide otherwise, the nature, validity, and
interpretation of a contract are governed by the law where the contract was made.”).
182. See id. ¶ 15, 164 P.3d at 1034.
183. See id.
184. See also Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1420 n.5 (10th Cir. 1985).
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In fact, although that statute has been on the books since 1890,185 the first case
to decide a choice-of-law issue with reference to the statute was the 1939
opinion in Monahan v. New York Life Insurance Co.186 Some courts have
characterized the statute as an embodiment of the lex loci contractus rule187
while others have stated that it is a departure from that general rule.188
Two lines of cases reflecting different rules seem to have developed for
resolving contractual choice-of-law issues; these have been referred to as the
“place of making” and “place of performance” rules.189 The place of making
rule is the most frequently cited and has its origins in Atchison, T. & S. F.
Railway Co. v. Smith,190 although Telex Corp. v. Hamilton191 and Clark v. First
National Bank192 are the cases most cited for this proposition. The place of
performance rule was established in Oklahoma jurisprudence by Richardson
v. Shelby193 but is most often cited by courts as being represented by Legg v.
Midland Savings & Loan Co.,194 Collins v. Holland,195 and Monahan v. New
York Life Insurance Co.196
At first glance, these two rules seem to be at odds with one another; and
each by itself seems contrary to the plain text of title 15, section 162 of the
Oklahoma Statutes. In application, however, there is little conflict between the
two rules and the statute. When properly applied, the distinction between the
rules distills down to rhetoric. However, misunderstanding the nature of the
rules has led to confusion.197 The bottom line is that under Oklahoma law, if
185. See STAT. § 864 (1890).
186. See 26 F. Supp. 859, 862 (W.D. Okla. 1939).
187. Recall that the term “lex loci contractus” can refer to either the place of making or the
place of performance. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 995 (9th ed. 2009).
188. Compare Rhody, 771 F.2d at 1420 n.5 (“While many Oklahoma cases do not appear
to rest directly on the statute, the majority follow the rule it embodies.”), and Bohannan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 24, 820 P.2d 787, 795 (stating the title 15, section 162 of the
Oklahoma Statutes is the statutory source for the lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis
rules), with Monahan, 26 F. Supp. at 862 (finding the statute to be contrary to the “established
principles of common law and usage”), and Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66,
¶ 26, 796 P.2d 276, 287 (“Section 162 is not a declaration of the rule of lex loci
contractus . . . .”).
189. See Webster, supra note 9, at 385.
190. See 1913 OK 162, ¶ 8, 132 P. 494, 496.
191. See 1978 OK 32, ¶ 8, 576 P.2d 767, 768.
192. See 1916 OK 404, ¶ 9, 157 P. 96, 98 (per curiam).
193. See 1895 OK 48, ¶ 17, 41 P. 378, 380.
194. See 1916 OK 46, ¶ 3, 154 P. 682, 684 (per curiam).
195. See 1934 OK 404, ¶ 15, 34 P.2d 587, 588 (per curiam).
196. See 26 F. Supp. 859, 861 (W.D. Okla. 1939).
197. See, e.g., Sec. Trust & Savs. Bank v. Gleichmann, 150 P. 908, 910 (1915) (per curiam)
(reversing the trial court’s determination that Oklahoma law should apply if the bank notes were
executed in Oklahoma regardless of their place of performance).
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the parties to a contract enter into the agreement in State X, but contemplate
performance of the contract to occur in State Y, the contract will be governed
by the law of State Y no matter which of the aforementioned rules is applied.198
The easiest rule to apply analytically is the plain text of title 15, section 162
of the Oklahoma Statutes, which provides that a contract is governed by the
law of the place of performance if one is indicated, and by the law of the place
of its making if there is no indication.199 In the above hypothetical, State Y’s
law will govern the contract because it is to be performed in that state.
Obviously the same analysis and result occur if you apply the rule from
Richardson or Collins that the law of the place of performance governs a
contract.200
The place of making rule will also produce the same result when applied
correctly. The place of making rule requires contracts to be governed by the
law of the place of making unless the parties indicate a mutual intention to the
contrary.201 Another well-established common law rule presumes that when
a contract is made in one place but is to be performed in another, the parties
intended that the laws of the place of performance govern the contract.202
Therefore, applying both common law rules to the aforementioned
hypothetical, the presumed intention of the parties is given effect and the law
of the place of performance governs instead of the law of the place of
making.203
Although the court opinions seem to interchange the rules, the majority of
them can be reconciled if the proper operation of the discussed rules is kept in
mind. If, at the time of contract execution, the parties indicated a place of
performance different from the place of making, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has never applied the place of making rule from Clark to the exclusion of the
place of performance rule. While it is more analytically satisfying to apply the
198. When the place of making and the place of performance are the same, then there is no
discrepancy in outcome between the two rules.
199. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001).
200. See Collins, 1934 OK 404, ¶ 15, 34 P.2d at 588; Richardson v. Shelby, 1895 OK 48,
¶ 17, 41 P. 378, 380. The deficiency in the “common law” rule that the place of performance
should govern a contract is that some contracts do not contemplate a place of performance when
they are made. See Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1985)
(finding no indication from the contract or circumstance that the parties indicated where the
automobile insurance contract was to be performed).
201. See Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 14, 164 P.3d 1028, 103334; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 1913 OK 162, ¶ 7, 132 P. 494, 496.
202. See Gleichmann, 150 P. at 911.
203. See James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci
Doctrine, the Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 957, 969
(1991).
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text of the statute and conduct the analysis in that order, the variance found in
the case law is without any substantive significance, and application of the rule
to a simple contractual choice-of-law dispute should prove straightforward.
C. Oklahoma Cases Addressing Contracts with Multiple Places of
Performance
The primary purpose of this comment is to develop a standard for the more
complex contractual choice-of-law disputes — those that arise when a contract
contemplates at least two distinct places of performance. Oklahoma lacks case
law to direct us in determining which place of performance should govern.
However, the court has not left us completely without guidance; there are
exactly two cases decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court that distinguish
between multiple places of performance. Unfortunately, the court did not
utilize any cognizable standard for selecting one place over another in either
case. Nevertheless, the language and analysis used by the court in these two
cases suggests that “the place of performance” in section 162 should be
understood as the principal place of performance.204
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Railway Co. v. Smith, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
indicated that when the parties to a contract contemplate more than one place
of performance, the law of the principal place of performance should govern
the agreement.205 As discussed supra in Part IIA1, the court applied Oklahoma
law to a contract entered into in Kansas which disclaimed liability for any
accidental injury that occurred on a train passage.206 The court concluded that
Oklahoma was the place where the contract was to be “principally performed”
because a much greater part of the journey was to occur in Oklahoma.207 The

204. See Atchison, 1913 OK 162, ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496 (holding that a contract was to be
governed by the law of Oklahoma where it was to be “principally performed”); 15 OKLA. STAT.
§ 162; see also Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 276, 288
(“Under these circumstances, it is clear that the contract was to be performed in major part in
Brazil.”); Webster, supra note 9, at 388 (stating that Atchison defined “place of performance”
as meaning the “principal place of performance”).
205. See Atchison, ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496. The fact that the parties, at the time the contract was
made, actually contemplated that performance would occur in two different states is significant.
If the parties were to only reference one state of performance when making the contact, but later
performance actually occurred in multiple places, then it would be an error for a court to “read
into the contract” multiple places of performance. Similarly, if the parties do not know where
the contract will be performed at the time the contract is made, the courts are not going to
decide after the fact that the contract indicated a place of performance, and will instead apply
the law of the place where the contract was made.
206. See id. ¶¶ 2, 16, 132 P. at 495, 497.
207. Id. ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496. About 100 miles of the journey was to occur in Oklahoma while
only “a short distance” was to be traversed in Kansas. See id. ¶ 2, 132 P. at 495.
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analysis and conclusion here are obvious and do very little to assist in
determining where the principal place of performance would be in a more
complex factual scenario.
In Panama Processes v. Cities Service Co., discussed supra in part IIA3, the
court was faced with a more difficult determination regarding whether a letter
of agreement between a minority shareholder and the majority shareholder of
a Brazilian corporation would be governed by the laws of Brazil or New
York.208 The letter agreement provided assurances to the minority shareholder
that the Brazilian corporation would not cease paying dividends or continue
to expand unless other conditions were first satisfied.209 The agreement was
negotiated and signed in New York at the majority shareholder’s principal
place of business.210
The court held that “the contract was to be performed in major part in
Brazil.”211 In reaching this decision, the majority engaged in a balancing test
where it identified the elements of performance which occurred in New York
and compared those with the performance that occurred in Brazil.212 However,
this analysis is almost as brief and one-sided as that in which the court engaged
in Atchison.213 The court recognized that some performance had to occur in
New York because the agreement required the majority shareholder to make
decisions consistent with the agreement — decisions which would be made at
its principal place of business in New York.214
However, the majority found this activity to be slight when compared with
the performance which occurred in Brazil.215 The court pointed out that any
decision made by the majority shareholder in New York would have to be
subsequently implemented by the corporate officers in Brazil.216 Furthermore,
and perhaps more importantly, the agreement explicitly provided that any
208. See 1990 OK 66, ¶¶ 1-2, 796 P.2d 276, 278-79. The letter agreement was actually
executed prior to the defendant (Cities) becoming the majority shareholder. See id. ¶ 2, 796
P.2d at 278-79. Cities became the majority shareholder of the Brazilian company when the
corporation bought back the stock from a third shareholder. See id. Before the plaintiff
(Panama) would allow that transaction to occur it wanted the assurances contained in the letter
agreement at issue. See id.
209. See id. ¶ 2 n.2, 796 P.2d at 279 n.2.
210. See id. ¶ 27, 796 P.2d at 288.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
212. See id. ¶¶ 28-30, 796 P.2d at 288.
213. See generally id.; Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 1913 OK 162, ¶ 10, 132 P. 494,
496.
214. See Panama Processes, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d at 287-88; see also id. ¶ 2 n.2, 796 P.2d at 279
n.2 (quoting the agreement which provided that the majority shareholder would not cause the
Brazilian corporation to stop paying dividends or expand further).
215. See id. ¶¶ 29-30, 796 P.2d at 288.
216. See id. ¶ 27, 796 P.2d at 288.
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future corporate policy was subject to “the industrial, fiscal, and political
situation in Brazil.”217 And finally, the agreement centered on the corporate
policy of a Brazilian corporation.218
Considering only these factors, the determination that Brazilian law would
govern the contract seems almost obvious from the outset. Remember that the
purpose of contractual interpretation, including choice-of-law determinations,
is to give effect to the intent of the parties at the time of contracting. The place
of performance rule was established in light of this principle.219 When one
examines the agreement through this lens, it is logical that Brazilian law
should govern. The subject matter of the contract was the corporate policy of
a Brazilian company and the contract made specific reference to the law and
financial climate of Brazil. Whether you look for the place of performance or
just to see whether the parties had selected a law to govern the contract, Brazil
is the obvious conclusion.
Atchison and Panama Processes both suggest that when a contract
contemplates two places of performance, the place where the larger part of that
performance is rendered — or the principal place of performance — should
govern.220 However, neither decision defines how this determination should
be made in cases involving two jurisdictions where relatively equal levels of
performance will be rendered.221 Additionally, as the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has not explicitly addressed this issue, the question of whether
determining the principal place of performance is actually what is required by
section 162 remains open. These questions will be discussed in depth in Part
IV of this comment.
D. Other Issues Left Unresolved by Oklahoma Case Law
The primary focus of this comment is on the phrase “place of performance”
in title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes.222 However, Oklahoma’s
choice-of-law jurisprudence has left two other gaps in the construction of
section 162. First, no Oklahoma court has defined what is meant by the word
“indicate.” Second, the term “interpretation” has never been defined, although
the cases and commentary seem to presume that section 162 applies to all
217. See id. ¶ 2 n.2, 796 P.2d at 279 n.2.
218. See id. ¶ 27, 796 P.2d at 288.
219. See Sec. Trust & Savs. Bank v. Gleichmann, 150 P. 908, 911 (Okla. 1915) (per curiam);
see also Webster, supra note 9, at 385 (stating that the “place of making” and “place of
performance” rules are “significant factors in determining the intent of the parties”).
220. See Panama Processes, ¶¶ 27-30, 796 P.2d at 287-88; Atchison T & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Smith, 1913 OK 162, ¶ 8, 132 P. 494, 496.
221. See Panama Processes, ¶¶ 27-30, 796 P.2d at 287-88; Atchison, ¶ 8, 132 P. at 496.
222. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001).
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contractual choice-of-law resolutions. These questions are merely presented
in this comment so that the issues are identified, but no resolution of the
matters is sought.
A possible construction of section 162, and one that may be tacitly utilized
in the context of motor vehicle insurance contracts,223 is to narrowly construe
the word “indicate” in section 162 to mean to “specify” a place of
performance. This essentially creates a pass-through to the second clause of
the statute and defaults to the place of making rule unless the parties expressly
state a place of performance in the terms of their agreement.224 This
interpretation of section 162 would reduce the need for deciding which place
of performance trumps; however, it would not eliminate the need entirely. The
parties could specify in their contract that different obligations are to be
performed in different places yet still not include a choice-of-law provision in
the agreement.225 In such a situation, the court would still have to decide
whether to select one of the specified places of performance to govern the
whole agreement or whether each obligation should be governed by the law
of the place where that obligation is to be performed.
Another plausible construction of section 162 is to narrowly construe its
application to only apply to the interpretation of ambiguous contractual terms
by taking the term “interpretation” literally. This would offer the court more
flexibility in applying either the lex loci contractus rules or adopting a more
modern choice-of-law approach without completely ignoring the text of
section 162. However, this is not consistent with prior case law and seems
unlikely to be adopted. Additionally, of the four states who utilize this statute,
only California has adopted this narrow application.226 Even then, it was done
in an attempt to reconcile the state’s modern jurisprudence with an old,
seemingly ignored statute.227 The remaining three states have understood the
statute to apply to all contractual choice-of-law determinations, and
commentators have agreed.228
223. See, e.g., Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 30, 820 P.2d 787, 797 (holding
that the place of making rule applies to motor vehicle insurance contracts without first inquiring
whether the contract indicates a place of performance); see also Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1985) (requiring a specific designation of a place of
performance in order to the place of performance rule to supplant the place of making rule).
224. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (“A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and
usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if it does not [specify] a place of performance,
according to the law and usage of the place where it is made.”).
225. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IVA (providing an illustrative hypothetical).
226. See Frontier Oil Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 816, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
227. See id.; see also discussion infra Part III on California’s contractual choice-of-law rules.
228. See infra Part III for discussion on Montana and South Dakota choice-of-law rules; see
also Webster, supra note 9, at 385.
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The rest of this comment assumes the term “interpretation” in section 162
does not limit the statute from applying to all contractual choice-of-law
questions because Oklahoma case law makes no attempt to treat it differently.
No assumption of the term “indicate” is required because regardless of what
construction the term is given, some method to assist in choice-of-law
determinations when a contract contemplates multijurisdictional places of
performance is still necessary.
III. Jurisdictions with Statutes Identical to Section 162
Oklahoma’s contractual choice-of-law statute is not unique in the United
States; three other states currently have statutes identical to title 15, section
162 of the Oklahoma Statutes — California, Montana, and South Dakota.229
A brief analysis of how these jurisdictions interpret and apply their statutory
directive compared with the jurisprudence that has developed in Oklahoma
helps to identify some of the options available to Oklahoma courts when
applying section 162. It is worth noting at the outset that none of these states
are considered among those that still apply the traditional lex loci contractus
rule when determining which law governs a contract.230 Additionally, none of
the four states with the statute apply it in exactly the same way, although some
similarities exist.
While California still has the statute on the books, the courts have relegated
it to the very narrow function of only applying to choice-of-law matters
concerning the interpretation of contract terms.231
The state applies a
“governmental interest” test to determine what law governs a contract for
anything that does not involve the interpretation of the contract.232 Despite this
limited role, any California decision determining that one place of
performance was to be applied over another would be insightful.
Unfortunately, no California case seems to have addressed this issue directly.
Of the three jurisdictions discussed in this section, California’s choice-oflaw jurisprudence is the most dissimilar to that of Oklahoma. Oklahoma
interprets title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes as controlling all
aspects of contract choice-of-law determinations that do not fall within the
purview of the U.C.C. or Bohannan exceptions. On the contrary, California
makes a distinction between matters bearing on interpretation and “other
229. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 53-1-4 (2004).
230. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004:
Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 942-44 (2004).
231. See Frontier Oil Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 835.
232. See id. at 835-36.
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choice-of-law issues.”233 Presumably, this narrow interpretation is made in
order to apply a more modern choice-of-law analysis to most choice-of-law
issues without judicially abrogating the statutory directive.234 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court could make a similar interpretation; however, so far the court
has made clear that it will not.235
In Montana, the statutory directive is still given effect despite the Montana
Supreme Court’s adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws’
“most significant relationship” test.236 Relying on section 6(1) of the
Restatement (Second), the Montana courts are to apply the “most significant
relationship” factors only when the text of section 28-3-102237 does not
apply.238 Therefore, the Montana courts only apply the Restatement (Second)
factors to determine whether a choice-of-law clause in a contract is
enforceable.239 However, this analysis becomes circular because the
Restatement (Second) section 187 provides that the parties’ choice-of-law
provision will only be invalidated in favor of another place’s law if, inter alia,
that other place’s law would apply absent a choice-of-law clause.240 And,
absent a choice-of-law clause, Montana looks to section 28-3-102.241
Therefore, Montana’s choice-of-law statute is implicated in either scenario.
The operation of Montana’s choice-of-law statute necessitates that when
determining which law governs a contract that does not have a choice-of-law
provision, the first step is to determine whether the contract indicates a place
of performance.242 Despite the rhetorical differences from Oklahoma’s
application of section 162, this inquiry is exactly the same. Unfortunately, the
Montana courts have not addressed the need for determining a contract’s
principal place of performance or otherwise articulated a standard for
determining which place of performance should control.
233. See id. at 835.
234. See id. at 830 (stating that California’s modern governmental interest analysis does not
judicially abrogate the statutory directive of California’s section 162 analogue).
235. See Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 30, 820 P.2d 787, 797 (“[W]e must
remain aligned with those states that continue to follow the lex loci contractus rule.”).
236. See Polzin v. Appleway Equip. Leasing Inc., 2008 MT 300, ¶¶ 16-18, 345 Mont. 508,
191 P.3d 476.
237. The text of Montana’s statute is nearly identical to Oklahoma’s title 15, section 162,
and reads: “A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where
it is to be performed or, if it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law and
usage of the place where it is made.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102.
238. See Polzin, ¶¶ 16-18; Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 MT 56, ¶ 40, 341 Mont.
467, 178 P.3d 102.
239. See, e.g., Polzin, ¶ 14.
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
241. See Polzin, ¶ 18.
242. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102; Wamsley, ¶ 40.
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South Dakota also appears to apply the Restatement (Second) in order to
determine whether a contractual choice-of-law provision is valid,243 but still
gives effect to its statutory directive in other contexts.244 Applying South
Dakota law, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South
Dakota found that when a contract indicates multiple places of performance,
the law of the “predominant” place of performance should govern the
contract.245 In the case of In re Worden, the court found Wyoming to be the
“predominant” place of performance because the contract restricted the
defendant from practicing as an accountant in three cities in Wyoming but only
one in South Dakota.246 This conclusion is as obvious as the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s decision in Atchison, T. & S. F. Railway Co. v. Smith247 and
does little to define a standard for making such determinations, other than to
suggest that the place where the most performance is to occur is the place of
performance that should count.248
Both Montana and South Dakota’s contractual choice-of-law rules are fairly
closely aligned with Oklahoma’s general contractual choice-of-law rule under
title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Although rhetorical differences
exist, and both Montana and South Dakota more openly embraces the
Restatement (Second)’s “most significant relationship” test, all three states
apply the place of performance rule when such a place is indicated by the
contract.
IV. Defining the Place of Performance
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has suggested that title 15, section 162 of the
Oklahoma Statutes should be understood as meaning the law of the principal
place of performance governs the interpretation of a contract, but the court has
yet to address this issue directly.249 This interpretation of section 162 is not its
only plausible construction. The term “principal place of performance”
implies that there can be only one place of performance to govern the entire
contract; that is, that each issue in the contract is governed by the law of the
same state. However, modern choice-of-law theories endorse the application
243. See Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 2001 SD 36, ¶ 11, 623
N.W.2d 484, 488.
244. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2009 SD 70, ¶ 22, 771
N.W. 2d 611, 618.
245. See In re Worden, 63 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1986).
246. See id.
247. 1913 OK 162, 132 P. 494.
248. See In re Worden, 63 B.R. at 723.
249. See supra Part IIC for discussion on Atchison, 1913 OK 162, 132 P. 494, and Panama
Processes v. Cities Service Co., 1990 OK 66, 796 P.2d 276.
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of laws from different places to different contract issues when those places
have “the most significant relationship” to a particular issue.250 A similar
approach could be utilized under the text of section 162, whereby contracts
with multiple promises or obligations could be governed by the law of
different places if each promise or obligation has a distinct place of
performance.251
Thus, the fundamental dichotomy is presented regarding the correct
interpretation of “the place of performance” under section 162. Should section
162 be read as requiring that a contract be governed by the law of a single,
“principal” place of performance? Or should each obligation arising under an
agreement be subject to the law of the place where that obligation is to be
performed?
A. An Illustrative Hypothetical
Before proceeding further, it is prudent to provide a hypothetical contract
that illustrates the concerns and objectives of our inquiry. Suppose that an oil
well operator hires a contractor to drill seven oil wells. Four wells are to be
drilled in State Y and three in State Z. The operator’s nerve center is located
in State X while the drilling contractor is headquartered in State Y. Assume the
drilling contract is a form contract where minimal negotiation occurs via email
and the contract is executed by the operator’s signature at its headquarters in
State X.
Now suppose that after drilling operations have commenced on the wells the
operator believes there has been a material breach of the drilling contract as it
pertains certain wells. Assume State X’s law would invalidate a provision in
the agreement and result in a determination of no breach while the other two
states’ laws would uphold the provision. If the operator files suit in State Z
against the drilling contractor for breach of contract, and State Z uses
Oklahoma’s choice-of-law rules, which state’s law should govern the contract?
Does it matter which state the wells in question are located in? What if the
alleged breach pertains to wells located in more than one state?
This hypothetical identifies two questions left unresolved by Oklahoma case
law. First, when a contract is to be performed approximately equally in
multiple places, which place should be considered the “principal” place of
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971) (“The rights and duties
of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties under the principles stated in §6.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 188 cmt. b (noting
that the protection of justified expectations can vary on an issue-by-issue basis).
251. See Nancy Yuenger, Law of the Place of Performance, 12 CAL. JUR. 3D CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 69 (2009) (citing Hayter v. Fulmor, 152 P.2d 746 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944)).
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performance? Second, should one state’s law govern an entire contractual
agreement or should each obligation arising under a contract be analyzed
separately? In other words, is inquiry into the “principal” place of
performance even necessary?
If a contract is to only be governed by one state’s law, then the court will
have to determine which place of performance was most essential to the
contract as a whole and apply that state’s law to the entire agreement. On the
contrary, if the obligations are to be bifurcated and subject to the law of the
place where each is to be performed, then the place of performance is
determined on an obligation-by-obligation basis. In the above hypothetical,
this could mean that there are potentially two different places of performance
and a court would have to apply the laws of multiple states to a single suit.
Therefore, the question of whether a contract should be governed by the law
of only one place, or whether separate obligations arising under a contract
should be governed by the law of separate places, is the threshold question.
If the former is the desired result, then a standard for determining the
“principal place of performance” must also be established.
B. The Principal Place of Performance Test
1. Rationale Supporting the Application of a Single Place’s Law
It is important to note at the outset that no Oklahoma Supreme Court
decision has applied the law of two separate places to a single contractual
dispute. However, this may be because the specific issue has never come
before the court. There is some support for both approaches — applying one
law to govern the whole contract or applying the laws of different places to
different parts of the contract — in Oklahoma’s case law; however, there
seems to be more Oklahoma authority to support the proposition that only one
law should govern a given agreement.
In Clark v. First National Bank, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that
the execution, interpretation, and validity of a contract are to be governed by
the law of the place of making, matters relating to performance should be
controlled by the law of the place of performance, and, matters regarding the
remedy by the law of the forum.252 Here, the language indicates that the law
of one place could determine whether a contract was validly entered into while
the law of another place would govern whether a material breach has
occurred.253 Despite this articulation of the rule, however, the holding in Clark
252. 1916 OK 404, ¶ 9, 157 P. 96, 98 (per curiam).
253. See Weintraub, supra note 1, § 3.4, at 96 (noting that the rule from the first
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) allows for the validity of a contract to be
determined by the law of the place of contracting while the sufficiency of performance is
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did not require the application of more than one state’s law to the issue before
it — whether a chattel mortgage was properly enforced in Kansas.254
Furthermore, Oklahoma case law has moved away from the rule
distinguishing validity, interpretation, and execution from performance.255
Later cases seek to find one law to govern the agreement and will apply that
law to both questions of validity and performance.256
To determine whether Oklahoma’s choice-of-law rules should apply one
law or multiple laws to a given contractual dispute, the text of section 162 is
the natural starting point: “A contract is to be interpreted according to the law
and usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if it does not indicate a
place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place where it is
made.”257 Necessary to our determination is the definition of the term
“contract.” Fortunately, the legislature has provided a definition: “A contract
is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing.”258 In contracts for the sale
of goods, the legislature further distinguishes the meaning of the word
“contract” from that of “agreement” and defines a contract as “the total legal
obligation that results from the parties' agreement.”259 “Agreement” is defined
as the “bargain of the parties in fact”.260 Therefore, the contract is the sum
total of agreements and the legal obligations that flow from them. Applying
this reasoning to section 162, it follows that the text of the statute does not
contemplate more than one law governing a contract, regardless of how many
different places the obligations are to be performed.
Additionally, this result may promote judicial efficiency. While requiring
judges to weigh all places of performance against each other and select one to
govern the contract is initially more difficult than the alternative, in the long
run it may be more efficient. If after the initial determination the judge were
required to apply the law of State X to one matter but the law of State Y to
determined by the place of performance and that these places could be distinct from each other).
254. See id. § 3.4, at 99.
255. See Webster, supra note 9, at 388 (stating that most cases have done away with this
distinction and that it was probably meaningless in the first place); see also McLaughlin, supra
note 203, at 970 (recognizing that “it is difficult to distinguish between ‘the nature and extent
of the duty to perform’ and the ‘sufficiency of performance’”) (internal citations omitted).
256. See, e.g., Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 276, 28788 (applying the law of the place of performance, which was distinct from the place of making,
to determine the validity of the contract). Despite this, however, the courts still state the rule
as applying the place of making to matters bearing on “nature, validity, and interpretation.”
See, e.g., Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 14, 164 P.3d 1028, 1033-34.
257. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001).
258. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (2001). See also (referencing 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-201(12).
259. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-201(12) (2009 Supp.).
260. Id. § 1-201(3).
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another, then the judge would have to acquaint himself with the law of both of
those places in order to make a correct determination. This is avoided if a little
more time and effort is expended at the outset to determine one “principal”
place of performance to govern the contract.
2. Factors Relevant to Determining the Principal Place of Performance
The primary disadvantage of this approach is the difficulty in identifying a
standard for analyzing a principle place of performance that is firm enough to
be used easily and predictably without frustrating either the purposes of the
law or the justified expectations or intent of the parties. It would be impossible
for this comment to definitively establish such a standard; however, some
possible factors include: 1) the quantity of performance rendered in each
location, 2) the essence of the contract as a whole, 3) the contract’s place of
making, and 4) the domicile of the parties.
The quantity of performance is the most obvious factor and requires little
discussion. As Panama Processes vs. Cities Service Co. and Atchison, T. &
S. F. Railway Co. make clear, when a much larger portion of performance is
to be rendered in one place, that place should be considered the “principal”
place of performance.261 However, when performance is spread more equally
among the interested jurisdictions — as it is in the above hypothetical — this
factor’s import becomes negligible.
Another possible solution is to look to the “essence” of the agreement. That
is, which obligation is the most foundational to the contract and where is that
duty performed? In the hypothetical above, the essence of the agreement
inquiry does not work particularly well because the contract centers on drilling
wells located in two distinct jurisdictions. Situations exist, however, where the
essence of an agreement could be confined to a single jurisdiction even though
parts of the contract would be performed in multiple states. There may be
times when the principal place of performance can be determined by the
“essence” of the agreement; however, this is just one factor that may or may
not be applicable depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case at
bar.
Another factor to consider is the contract’s place of making. While it may
at first seem anomalous to include the place of making as part of our analysis
when determining the place of performance, there is a good reason to do so —
both the place of making and place of performance rules are intended to help
determine the intent of the parties at the time of contracting.262 Our immediate
261. See Panama Processes, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 276, 287-88; see also supra Part IIC (discussing
Panama Processes and Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith).
262. See Webster, supra note 9, at 385 (“Oklahoma has misunderstood those well-reasoned
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inquiry is focused on choosing one place of performance over another;
however, our choice-of-law rules as a whole should seek to effectuate the
implied intent of the parties. If the place of making is the same as one place of
performance, then it is reasonable that the parties can be presumed to have
expected that place’s law to govern the contract. It is at least more likely that
the parties intended or expected the law of the place where both making and
performance occur to control over the law of a place where only performance
is present.
In the above hypothetical, the contract was executed in State X and
performance was to occur State Y and State Z. Suppose instead that two wells
were to be drilled in all three states. The parties are more likely to expect a
contract which is made in State X and partially performed in State X to be
governed by the laws of State X than either the laws of State Y or State Z.
Therefore, State X could be the “principal” place of performance in this
modified hypothetical.
However, like the essence of a contract, the contract’s place of making is
not a universally applicable factor for determining the principal place of
performance. This factor will only be relevant when deciding between places
where relatively equal amounts of performance are to occur. In the unaltered
hypothetical, the place of making cannot be said to make either State Y or State
Z more likely the place contemplated or expected by the parties. Similarly, if
the amount of performance that occurred in the state of execution was
negligible when compared to that which occurred elsewhere, then the place of
making factor bears little significance.
The final factor identified in this comment as relevant to determining the
principal place of performance is the domicile of the parties. Because we are
seeking to glean the implied intent of the parties, their domicile may be
germane. If both parties are domiciled in the same place, and their contract is
to be performed in part in that place, it is more likely that the parties intended
for that place’s law to govern their contract rather than the law of another
place. However, this factor is not relevant if the parties are domiciled in a state
where no performance or only slight performance is rendered.
C. The Per-Obligation Approach Explained
Interpreting title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes to allow for more
than one state’s substantive law to govern a contractual dispute is an adoption
cases which have referred to the place of making and place of performance as significant factors
in determining the intent of the parties and the law which will uphold the contract.”); accord
Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546, 555 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he true test for the
determination of the proper law of a contract is the intent of the parties.”) (quoting Tate v.
Hain, 25 S.E.2d 321, 324 (Va. 1943) (per curiam)).
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of the doctrine of dépeçage — something the Oklahoma courts have not yet
done.263 Dépeçage is defined as the application of the rules of different states
to govern different issues in the same case.264 While utilization of dépeçage
is more common in jurisdictions employing an interest-analysis approach to
choice of law, the territorial rules can also result in the application of two
places’ law to the same contract.265 Therefore, the primary rationale for
interpreting section 162 to allow for the laws of multiple places to govern the
same contract is the same as the goals advanced by the general doctrine of
dépeçage.
Dépeçage is appropriate when its application: “(a) would result in the
application to each issue of the rule of the state with the greatest concern in the
determination of that issue, (b) would serve to effectuate the purpose of each
of the rules applied, and (c) would not disappoint the expectations of the
parties.”266 The overall rationale of dépeçage is to subject a contract to only
those rules which best advance the intent or expectations of the parties and the
purposes of the substantive law involved.
In the hypothetical above, suppose that the law suit concerns only drilling
the wells located in State Z. At the outset, the parties knew those wells would
be drilled in State Z. The application of the laws of either State X or State Y
seems quite arbitrary. It is true that if the place of making rule predominates
then the law of State X would govern, and it is plausible State Y could be
deemed the principal place of performance because the most wells are to be
drilled there. However, application of the law of State Z to obligations which
are performed in State Z is logical and consistent with the parties’ justified
expectations. Surely the parties should expect that obligations regarding the
drilling of wells in State Z to be governed by the laws of State Z. It is even
probable the drilling contractor will alter its behavior to conform to the laws
of State Z. Our choice-of-law rules should not frustrate these expectations
without an overriding policy reason for doing so.
Additionally, the definition given to the term “contract” in Part IVB, supra,
does not mandate that the law of only one place of performance be applied.
Even if the contract is the sum of all agreements, it does not necessarily follow
263. See Perkins v. Chris Hunt Water Hauling Contractor, Inc., 46 Fed. App’x. 903, 906
(10th Cir. 2002) (stating that Oklahoma has not ruled on the use of dépeçage and finding that
Oklahoma case law does not necessarily approve of it).
264. Willis L. M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM.
L. R EV . 58, 58 (1973); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 505 (9th ed. 2009) (“A court’s
application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an
issue-by-issue basis.”).
265. Weintraub, supra note 1, § 3.4, at 96.
266. Reese, supra note 267, at 60.
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that only one law can govern the contract. Stated another way — “the place
of performance” does not have to be read as “the only place of performance.”
Even the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) contemplates that a
contract can be made up of different promises which can be performed in
different places, with the law of each of those places governing the aspect of
performance that is to be performed there.267
This “per-obligation” approach, while never addressed or utilized by an
Oklahoma court, is also consistent (or at least not inconsistent) with
Oklahoma’s case law. Specifically, the rationale squares with the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s holding in Panama Processes v. Cities Service Co..268 At
issue in Panama Processes was a letter agreement whereby the majority
shareholder of a Brazilian corporation assured the sole remaining minority
shareholder that the corporation would continue to pay dividends and would
not expand its productive capacities any further.269 Performance occurred
partly at the majority shareholder’s headquarters in New York and partly at the
Brazilian corporation’s location in Brazil.270 The dispute was whether the
letter agreement was enforceable — New York would enforce the agreement
while Brazil would not.271
The subject matter of the letter agreement was the future conduct of the
Brazilian corporation; conduct that would be performed by the corporation’s
officers in Brazil.272 Therefore, under the “per-obligation” approach described
above, matters relating to that conduct — here whether an agreement of such
conduct was enforceable — should be determined by the law of Brazil.
Furthermore, as noted by the court in its opinion, this outcome is consistent
with the parties’ implied intent because they should not reasonably expect an
agreement made in New York respecting conduct which occurred in Brazil to
frustrate the corporate law and policies of Brazil.273

267. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 355 cmt. a (1934).
268. 1990 OK 66, 796 P.2d 276. Recall that this case is one of only two Oklahoma cases
choosing between more than one place of performance. See discussion supra Part IIB for
analysis of the two relevant cases. Additionally, Panama Processes is particularly relevant
because it involves a more detailed analysis of the issue than does Atchison.
269. See Panama Processes, ¶ 2 n.2, 796 P.2d at 279 n.2.
270. See id. ¶ 27, 796 P.2d at 288.
271. See id. ¶ 5 n.13, 796 P.2d at 280-81 n.13.
272. See id. ¶ 27, 796 P.2d at 288.
273. See id.
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D. The Per-Obligation Theory Better Advances the Purposes of the Choiceof-Law Rules
“The general aim of choice of law is to apply the law that makes the most
sense in settling the legal dispute before the court.”274 In the majority of cases,
the “principal place of performance” and “per-obligation” approaches will
result in the same conclusion because most disputes will center on the place
where the most performance occurs. However, when a dispute revolves
around a matter that relates to a place of performance that is not the “principal”
place of performance, the outcomes of the two schools diverge. The choiceof-law rule that better protects the interests of the parties and the law in these
“outlier” scenarios is the rule that should be adopted.
With the aforementioned goal in mind, an examination of the “outlier” cases
reveals that the “per-obligation” approach is more desirable than determining
the “principal place of performance” because the outcome fundamentally
makes more sense. Furthermore, choice-of-law rules should seek to apply the
law of the place with the most dominant interest to the case at bar and should
be easy to apply.275
In the unaltered hypothetical above, assume that the “principal place of
performance” is State Y because the most wells are drilled there. Also suppose
that the issue before the court is whether the contractor breached a provision
of the contract relating to drilling wells in State Z. Recall that the contract was
entered into in State X. The disposition of matters relating to performance
which occurred in State Z should be governed by the laws of State Z because
that is the place which has the most dominant interest in the resolution of a
dispute. What interest could State X or State Y have in the resolution of
matters relating to conduct which occurred in State Z? Certainly whatever
interest either does have is subordinate to State Z’s interest in resolving the
matter. The conclusion that either the law of State X or the law of State Y
should apply to a dispute over performance in State Z seems arbitrary and
nonsensical, even if that conclusion is founded upon a “well-established” rule.
Furthermore, the “per-obligation” approach is easier to apply than the
“principal place of performance” test. While it may result in more than one
place’s law controlling a dispute, which place that will be and what that
place’s law will control are readily apparent. Neither the parties, nor the
courts, will have to guess at which single place of performance is the

274. McLaughlin, supra note 203, at 958.
275. See Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 972, 976 (1952).
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“principal” place of performance. This certainty of outcome is the hallmark
of the territorial choice-of-law rules and should not be frustrated.
Seeking to find one “principal” jurisdiction’s law to govern a multi-state
contract simply trades one overly formalistic rule (the place of making rule)
for another. The shortcomings of such singular approaches are well
documented, and the modern choice-of-law theories have sought to remedy
these failings.276 While title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma Statutes is
certainly a vestige of the older, territorial approaches to choice of law, there
is no reason why it cannot be construed to allow for a more modern and betterreasoned analysis in those cases where multiple places of performance have
been indicated by the contract.
V. Conclusion
Oklahoma’s contractual choice-of-law rules are varied and, at times,
confusing. For general contract disputes, title 15, section 162 of the Oklahoma
Statutes requires the law of the place where performance is rendered to govern
the contract unless there is no indication of such a place. Then, and only then,
should the place of making rule be applied. When a contract indicates more
than one place of performance and the parties have not selected their own
choice of law, then matters relating to each obligation should be governed by
the law of the place where that particular obligation is to be performed. This
“per-obligation” approach better advances the rationale underlying the choiceof-law field by allowing for sensible conclusions instead of arbitrary results
based upon formalistic rules.
Patrick L. Stein

276. See Reese, supra note 267, at 59 (stating that the old rigid rules “have been tried and
found wanting.”).
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